The empirical literature on intergenerational income mobility in the United States has focused predominantly on sons. This paper partly redresses that imbalance by using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to investigate intergenerational mobility among daughters. We find that intergenerational transmission of income status may be somewhat weaker for daughters than for sons, but is still quite substantial. We also find that assortative mating is an important element in the intergenerational transmission process.
I. Introduction
The early empirical literature on intergenerational income mobility in the United States focused mainly on the association of earnings between fathers and sons. This literature suggested that the elasticity of son's earnings with respect to father's earnings is 0.2 or less.
1 Most of these studies, however, used single-year or other short-run measures of father's earnings. Presumably, we should be more interested in estimating the intergenerational association in long-run income status, in which case reliance on short-run measures induces a downward errors-in-variables bias. In addition, the peculiar homogeneity of some of the early studies' samples 2 aggravated the errors-in-variables bias by diminishing the "signal" proportion of the sample variation in measured earnings.
A more recent wave of studies has set out to reduce this bias by using intergenerational data from two longitudinal surveys, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal Surveys of labor market experience. 3 Because these data pertain to national probability samples, they avoid the homogeneity of the earlier samples. Furthermore, the longitudinal nature of the data has enabled exploration of the empirical importance of using long-run instead of short-run income measures.
Most of the evidence from the new studies suggests that the elasticity between the permanent components of son's and father's earnings is about 0.4.
1 Becker and Tomes (1986) .
2 For example, the fathers in Behrman and Taubman's (1985) study were drawn from a sample of white male twins in which both members of each twin pair had served in the armed forces and then cooperated with a succession of surveys.
Unfortunately, both the old and new literatures focused very disproportionately on sons. 4 Presumably, this neglect of daughters has stemmed partly from unconscious sexism and partly from a recognition that, in a society in which married women's labor force participation rates are lower than men's, women's earnings may often be an unreliable indicator of their economic status. Of the few studies that have presented evidence on daughters' intergenerational mobility, some have excluded from their samples the many women with zero earnings, and most have given little attention to the role of husbands' earnings.
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This paper presents new evidence on daughters' intergenerational mobility in a framework that encompasses women not in the labor force, uses broader measures of economic status than just the women's own earnings, and highlights the role of husbands' earnings. For purposes of comparison, we perform a parallel analysis of sons' mobility, which similarly contributes to the sons literature by focusing on family income and on the role of wives' earnings. We find that intergenerational transmission of income status may be somewhat weaker for daughters than for sons, but is still quite substantial. We also find that assortative mating is an important element in the intergenerational transmission process.
The next section of the paper presents a simple model that illustrates the potential importance of assortative mating in the intergenerational transmission of economic status. Section III describes our 4 The senior author of the present paper is at least as guilty of this lapse as anyone.
5 The two studies most like our own are Minicozzi (1997) and Shea (1997) . Minicozzi estimates a 0.41 coefficient in the regression of the log of a two-year average of the daughter's annual earnings (when ages 28 and 29) on the log of an estimate of the present discounted value of her parents' lifetime earnings. Daughters with zero earnings at age 28 or 29 are omitted from the analysis, and other sources of daughter's family income, such as husband's earnings, are not considered. Shea estimates a 0.54 coefficient in the regression of the log of a multi-year average of the daughter's annual earnings on the log of a multi-year average of her parents' family income. He also estimates a 0.39 coefficient in the regression in which the dependent variable is instead the log of a multi-year average of the daughter's family income. Shea does not look specifically at the role of husband's earnings in the latter estimate. See Solon (1999) for a more complete summary of the literature.
data, Section IV lays out our econometric framework, Section V presents our empirical results, and Section VI summarizes and discusses our findings.
II. Assortative Mating and Intergenerational Mobility
Broadly speaking, the expression "assortative mating" refers to any non-randomness in the process of who mates with whom. The glossary appended to Epstein and Guttman's (1984) oftencited survey article defines assortative mating as "character-specific mate selection which would not be expected to occur by chance." The reasons for such systematic mate selection are discussed in economic terms in the theoretical analyses by Becker (1991) and Lam (1988 We are interested in the role that assortative mating plays in the intergenerational persistence of economic status. We express that role formally with a rudimentary version of the model developed by Lam and Schoeni (1993, 1994 First, Lam and Schoeni (1994) show that the regression of the daughter's husband's log earnings on her parents' log income can be written as
where the elasticity h β of the daughter's husband's earnings with respect to her parents' income is
Thus, if there is no assortative mating on earnings ( 0 = γ ), this elasticity is zero. On the other hand, with positive assortative mating on earnings, this elasticity is positive. The possibility that this elasticity is substantial in the United States is suggested by Altonji and Dunn's (1991) finding of a 0.26 sample correlation between multi-year averages of the age-adjusted log earnings of the daughter's husband and her father. Lam and Schoeni emphasize that the husband's earnings may be just as elastic as the daughter's own earnings with respect to her parents' economic status. As equation (4) shows, this is possible if assortative mating is strong and husbands' log earnings are more dispersed than wives' earnings. Indeed, using a sample from York, England, Atkinson, Maynard, and Trinder (1983) estimate that the elasticity of the daughter's husband's earnings with respect to her father's earnings is just as great as the elasticity of a son's earnings with respect to his own father's earnings. Lillard and Kilburn (1995) report a similar finding for Malaysia.
Second, the model also has strong implications for the connection between the daughter's family income and that of her parents. Suppose that her family income is comprised entirely of her own earnings and her husband's, and let S denote her husband's share of their combined earnings. Then the elasticity of her family income with respect to that of her parents is
the share-weighted average of the separate elasticities of the daughter's own earnings and her husband's. If there is no assortative mating, so that 0 = h β , and if the husband's earnings are greater than the wife's (as they emphatically are for most of our sample), then the daughter's family income is much less elastic with respect to her parents' income than her own earnings are. On the other hand, suppose that assortative mating is very positive, and h β is just as large as w β . Then in the typical family, in which S is much more than half, the association between the daughter's family income and that of her parents is mostly accounted for by her husband's earnings.
intergenerational income mobility that gives special attention to the role of assortative mating. We also present a parallel investigation for sons. Unlike the simple model in this section, our empirical analysis considers individuals that do not marry or do not participate in the labor force.
III. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal survey conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. The PSID began in 1968 with a national probability sample of about 5,000 families, and it has conducted annual reinterviews each year since. For purposes of intergenerational mobility research, the crucial feature of the survey is that it has followed children from the original families as they have grown into adulthood and formed their own households. As a result, it is now possible to relate the children's income status as adults to the status of their parents as annually reported by the parents themselves since the outset of the survey. 
where A is 0 is the age of the parental household head in year s . The quadratic specifications for the age profiles are less restrictive than they may seem at first, because different quadratics are allowed for the daughter's and parents' generations, which are observed over different age ranges.
The implied relationship between the daughter's log income in year t and the parents' log income in year s is
If least squares estimation is performed for this regression of the daughter's log income in year t on the parents' log income in year s and age controls for both generations, the correlation between the key regressor y is 0 and the error component v is 0 induces an errors-in-variables bias in the estimation of the intergenerational elasticity ρ . In particular, if all the error components are uncorrelated with each other, parental permanent income, and both generations' ages, then the least squares estimator of ρ in this regression is subject to the classical errors-in-variables inconsistency
where σ y 2 denotes the population variance in parents' permanent status y i 0 and σ v 2 is the variance of the measurement noise v is 0 .
Like many recent studies of intergenerational mobility, we will reduce this errors-in-variables bias by measuring parental status with a multi-year average of parental log income. Specifically, we will apply least squares to the regression least squares to this regression, the probability limit of the resulting $ ρ is the same as in equation (10) except that σ v 2 , the single-year noise variance, is replaced by the variance of the averaged noise v i 0 .
Under a broad range of assumptions, the latter variance is smaller, which presumably is the main reason that, in Table 1 , the sample variance of the five-year average of parental log income is only 80 percent of that of the 1967 value. Accordingly, the errors-in-variables bias in estimating the intergenerational elasticity will be reduced, though not eliminated.
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Once we have estimated the intergenerational income elasticity in this way, we will perform a more detailed analysis of the 70 percent of our daughters sample that is married. For that subsample, in addition to estimating equation (11), we will re-estimate the equation with a new dependent variable, the log of the sum of the daughter's earnings ( E wit ) and her husband's earnings ( E hit ). 9 As shown in equation (5) in Section II, we can write the elasticity β of the couple's combined earnings with respect to the daughter's parents' income as β β
where β w is the elasticity of the daughter's own earnings with respect to her parents' income, β h is the elasticity of her husband's earnings with respect to her parents' income, and
) is the typical share of husband's earnings in combined earnings.
For purposes of inferring the β 's on the right side of equation (5), it is useful to write the log of the couple's combined earnings as
where S it is the share of husband's earnings in couple i 's combined earnings in year t . Then in addition to estimating β by re-estimating equation (11) All of our empirical analyses use least squares to estimate equation (11), with various choices of dependent variable and sample. We begin by estimating the elasticity of daughter's family income with respect to her parents' family income for our full sample of 533 daughters. As shown in the first column of Table 2 , the estimated elasticity is 0.43. This estimate is similar to Shea's (1997) estimate of 0.39, previously mentioned in footnote 5. It also is similar to most recent estimates of the elasticity of son's earnings with respect to father's earnings, but, as we will see below, sons show larger elasticity estimates when parents' family income is the measure of parental status.
In an analysis not shown in the table, we crudely adjust each generation's family income measure for family size and composition by dividing income by the official poverty line for a family of that type. The elasticity of the daughter's "income-to-needs ratio" with respect to that of her parents is estimated at 0.49 (with estimated standard error 0.05), even higher than the elasticity estimate for unadjusted income. This result is suggestive of substantial intergenerational persistence in family structure.
11
10 Of course, one might try to estimate β w more directly by re-estimating equation (11) with daughter's log earnings as the dependent variable. That approach is awkward, however, because of the frequency with which daughter's earnings are zero. This also is why it is not very useful to write equation (13) 
11 Two other analyses explore nonlinearity in the intergenerational relation and the impact of age restrictions. To explore nonlinearity, we include the square of y i 0 as an additional regressor in equation (11). The estimated coefficient of the squared term is only -0.004 (with estimated standard error 0.063). We also redo the analysis in the One of the main contributions of our study is to explore the role of assortative mating in intergenerational mobility of married daughters. Toward that end, we now exclude the female household heads who comprise 30 percent of our original sample, and we focus on the remaining 372 married daughters.
12 As shown in the second column of Table 2 , when we re-estimate the intergenerational elasticity in family income for this subsample, the estimate falls slightly to 0.41. 13 To begin exploring the roles of each spouse's earnings, we also re-estimate the intergenerational elasticity with log( ) E E wit hit + , the log of the sum of the daughter's earnings and her husband's earnings, as the dependent variable. Doing so reduces the estimated intergenerational elasticity slightly further to 0.39.
Because the analysis in the last column of Table 2 will require taking the log of husband's earnings, we are forced to drop seven cases in which husband's 1991 earnings are zero. When we reestimate the intergenerational elasticities with the remaining sample of 365 daughters, the estimates fall to 0.39 when the dependent variable is log family income and 0.35 when it is the log of the couple's combined earnings. Next we follow the procedure discussed in Section IV for decomposing the latter estimate into the parts associated with the daughter's earnings and her husband's earnings.
first column of Table 2 with the sample restricted to daughters at least 30 years old (instead of just 25) in 1991. This analysis is motivated by Reville's (1995) finding that the estimated elasticity of son's earnings with respect to father's earnings becomes much higher when the sons are observed in their thirties instead of their twenties. Changing the age floor for our daughters sample from 25 to 30 reduces the sample size to 395 and raises the estimated intergenerational income elasticity from 0.429 to 0.443 (0.070). Performing the same exercise for our sons sample in the first column of Table 3 reduces the sample size to 380 and raises the estimated intergenerational income elasticity from 0.535 to 0.584 (0.062).
12 This subsample also excludes one married daughter whose own earnings and husband's earnings in 1991 were both zero. Including this case in the subsample raises the estimated intergenerational elasticity in family income from 0.408 to 0.409. We could boost the size of our married-daughters subsample by replacing some of the excluded unmarried daughters with their married younger sisters. Doing so results in estimates similar to those reported in Table 2 . This same point applies to our later analysis of married sons.
13 A parallel re-estimation for the subsample of 160 unmarried daughters produces an estimate of 0.435 (with estimated standard error 0.112).
First, we estimate the elasticity of the daughter's husband's earnings with respect to her parents'
income. The estimate of 0.36 is very close to the 0.35 estimate for the couple's combined earnings.
The fourth row of the table, which reports the estimated elasticity of the daughter's husband's share of their combined earnings with respect to her parents' income, makes explicit that the discrepancy is only 0.01 and is insignificantly different from zero. 14 As explained in Section IV, this result suggests that β β w h ≅ , i.e., the elasticities of the daughter's earnings and her husband's earnings with respect to her parents' income are nearly the same.
As shown in equation (5), the elasticity of the couple's combined earnings with respect to her parents' income is just a weighted average of these two elasticities. The two elasticities contribute similarly in the sense that the two numbers averaged together are about the same as each other. In another sense, though, the elasticity of the husband's earnings contributes more importantly. The weight on the husband's elasticity is his share in their combined earnings and, for most couples, that is a majority share. In our regression sample of 365 married daughters, the mean value of the husband's earnings share is 0.71. The median also is 0.71, even the 25 th percentile is more than half at 0.54, and the 75 th percentile is 0.95. If we use a weight of S = 0 71 . in equation (5), we conclude that, if there were no assortative mating in the sense of a zero elasticity between the daughter's husband's earnings and her parents' income, the elasticity of the couple's combined earnings with respect to her parents' income would be only a little more than one-fourth of what it actually is.
14 Our linear model for log( ) S it is convenient for the accounting framework developed in Section IV, but it ignores that log( ) S it is a limited dependent variable with an upper bound at zero. When we perform maximum likelihood estimation of a Tobit model for log( ) S it , we duplicate our linear model result that the estimated coefficient of the parental income variable is small and statistically insignificant. The same goes for our later analysis of married sons.
elasticity for daughters range between 0.35 and 0.49. While these estimates suggest a considerable degree of intergenerational mobility, they also suggest considerable intergenerational persistence, considerably more than one might have guessed from the early literature on sons. Second, assortative mating appears to play a crucial role. For the typical married daughter, a major factor in the intergenerational transmission of income status is that the elasticity of her husband's earnings with respect to her parents' income is just as great as the elasticity of her own earnings.
Finally, for comparison, in Table 3 we display the results of a parallel analysis for sons. For our full sample of 501 sons, 15 we estimate an intergenerational family income elasticity of 0.54, even higher than the corresponding 0.43 estimate for daughters. The t-ratio for the contrast between these two estimates is 1.23, so the contrast is not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. At first, the 0.54 estimate may seem surprisingly high relative to the typical 0.4 estimate in the recent literature on sons' intergenerational earnings mobility. A closer look at the literature, however, reveals that higher estimates are common when parental status is measured by family income rather than father's earnings.
In Solon (1992) , for example, the regression of son's 1984 log earnings on father's 1967 log earnings produces an elasticity estimate of 0.39, but the regression of son's 1984 log family income on father's 1967 log family income produces an estimate of 0.48. 16 Given that the present study reduces the errors-in-variables bias by using a multi-year average of parental income, it is unsurprising that the elasticity estimate becomes even a little larger. In fact, when we use single-year measures of parental log income in our present sample, the resulting elasticity estimates are 0. Restricting the sample to the 340 married sons leaves the estimated intergenerational family income elasticity at 0.54 and also produces an estimate of 0.58 for the elasticity of the couple's combined earnings with respect to his parents' family income. 17 The t-ratio for the contrast between the 0.54 estimate and the corresponding 0.41 estimate for daughters is 1.62, just short of significance at the 0.10 level. The t-ratio for the contrast between the 0.58 estimate and the corresponding 0.39 estimate for daughters is 2.13, which is significant at the 0.05 level. In the last column, where two sons with zero earnings in 1991 are dropped from the sample, the estimated intergenerational family income elasticity decreases to 0.51, and the estimated elasticity for the couple's combined earnings decreases to 0.55.
The t-ratio of 1.51 for the contrast between the 0.51 estimate and the corresponding 0.39 for daughters is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The t-ratio of 2.29 for the contrast between the 0.55 estimate and the corresponding 0.35 estimate for daughters is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
When the 0.55 elasticity estimate for combined earnings is decomposed to explore the roles of the son's earnings and his wife's earnings, the elasticity for his own earnings is estimated at 0.52. As shown in the last row, the discrepancy between this estimate and the 0.55 estimate for combined earnings is small and statistically insignificant. As found for daughters, it appears again that the elasticities for own earnings and spouse's earnings are similar. In other words, assortative mating clearly is at work in the intergenerational transmission of income status for sons as well as daughters. It is less important, though, in the sense that the wife's elasticity enters equation (5) for sons with a smaller weight than the husband's elasticity receives in the equation for daughters. In our regression sample of 338 married sons, the mean value of the wife's earnings share is 0.29, and the median also is 0.29.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to estimate intergenerational income elasticities for daughters, we have obtained estimates ranging from 0.35 to 0.49. These estimates are smaller than our corresponding estimates for sons, though in some instances the contrasts between the estimates for daughters and sons fall short of statistical significance. In any case, the estimated intergenerational elasticities for daughters are quite substantial. We also have found that assortative mating plays an important role in the intergenerational transmission process. Among married offspring, spouse's earnings appear to be just as elastic as the offspring's own earnings with respect to the parents' income.
One direction for future research is to explore whether these results can be replicated with other data sets. This can be checked for the United States with data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of labor market experience, but analyses of data from other countries ultimately may be even more informative. Not only do data sets from other countries sometimes provide much larger sample sizes;
international comparisons may generate valuable clues about the causal processes underlying the intergenerational associations we have measured. Lam and Schoeni (1994) , for example, compare the Brazilian and U.S. associations of daughter's husband's wage rate with her father's years of schooling, and they interpret the contrast in terms of differences between Brazil and the United States in assortative mating. More generally, the accumulation of additional evidence on intergenerational mobility by gender should stimulate further theoretical and empirical analysis of how assortative mating, parental decisions to invest in their children, and other factors contribute to intergenerational mobility for both daughters and sons. 
